administrative or legal mechanism should be used to effect compensation?
Some of the issues that should be addressed in evaluating proposals for new compensation legislation include: (1) do existing income replacement and medical care programs, including tort actions, provide sufficient compensation to individuals who have a chronic illness that may have originated with exposure to hazardous substances, and (2) are incentives for due care by those who generate, transport or dispose of hazardous substances now adequate?
Background
The current congressional debate over toxic compensation has its roots in the legislation that created the "Superfund" for the cleanup of toxic waste dumps. At the time the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 (P.L.96-510) was enacted, Congress considered but rejected various proposals to include personal injury compensation within the scope of that legislation. Ultimately, personal injury compensation was not included due to uncertainty over the need for such a provision and pragmatic considerations related to passing the legislation. To help resolve the issue of need regarding personal injury compensation, Section 301(e) of CERCLA called for a report to Congress on the adequacy of existing legal remedies and recommendations for improvements in the law.
On July 30, 1983 the 301(e) Study Group submitted to Congress its analysis of existing remedies (1). Included was a recommendation for a two-tier system of remedies for personal injuries and damages caused by the release of hazardous substances from waste sites. The Study Group's "Tier I" proposal would represent a significant change in existing compensation systems. Access to Tier I remedies would be based on standards of proof much relaxed from traditional tort liability. Tort actions regarding toxic waste injuries generally require that the plaintiff (1) identify a party who is responsible, (2) prove that the substance caused an injury, and (3) show that the conduct of the responsible party did not meet a common law standard of care or that the activity was so hazardous that it should be governed by rules of strict liability. Under the Tier I recommendation, claimants would not need to identify the party or parties responsible for a release of a hazardous waste. The compensation fund would have the right of subrogation against responsible parties for releases that occurred after the creation of the Tier I remedy. This right of subrogation would give the fund all of the legal rights formerly held by the claimant; thus the fund could consolidate cases relating to a single release and seek reimbursement of its compensation expenditures from a responsible party. To the extent fund expenses are reimbursed, incentives for care are given to waste generators and disposal firms (2 Many of the basic proposals of the 301(e) Study Group have been incorporated into the toxic compensation bills now before Congress. In evaluating these proposals, it is essential to review the existing structure of compensation mechanisms. Two perspectives are particularly important. First, how broad is the coverage in terms of compensating deserving individuals and second, are incentives for care incorporated in the mechanism that finances compensation? We will turn to the first of these issues initially.
A Review of Existing Compensation Mechanisms
In assessing the need for and desirability of changes in the mechanisms that compensate individuals with chronic illness, an important consideration is the depth and breadth of coverage under existing compensation programs. A review of existing compensation mechanisms should help to determine (1) if there are large numbers of people whose losses presently go uncompensated by existing mechanisms, and (2) the extent of coverage in terms of the percentage of the loss that is replaced. This review is intended to look at the compensation mechanisms as they potentially would be available to anyone in the U.S. with a chronic illness. The question of how many of such illnesses might be caused by toxic substance exposure is not considered.
At the outset, one may note that compensation can take two forms: as a payment for bearing risk that precedes any injury and as a payment to an individual who incurs a loss. This review focuses on the second form of compensation-payments made after a loss has occurred.
Economic losses by individuals with chronic illnesses may be categorized as follows: lost income while the individual lives, medical expenses, lost income from premature death, pain and suffering, and loss of nonwage contributions to the family and society. The most recent, relatively complete information on the extent to which individuals disabled by chronic illnesses are recovering their lost income (4), suggested that approximately 40% of the pre-tax income lost by those severely disabled by occupational disease was replaced. The percentage of workers with various sources of support included: social security, 53%; private pensions, 21%; veterans benefits, 17%; welfare, 16%; workers' compensation, 5%; and private insurance, 1%. Tort actions compensated less than 1%. In this sample, 45% of those severely disabled by occupational disease received support from a single source; 29% received support from two sources, and 5% received support from three or more sources. Some 22% received no form of income replacement. Social security provided not only the broadest coverage but it also was increasing rapidly during the period in which the data were collected (1974). Thus, coverage today is likely to be broader than it was at the time of the survey.
In terms of the number of people covered, private insurance is the dominant mechanism for meeting the medical expenses associated with chronic illness. Presently approximately 80% of the population has some form of private hospitalization insurance and over 65% of the population has private insurance coverage for major medical expenses. Public A third theory of expanded liability is termed "industrywide liability" or "enterprise liability." This theory shares features of the first two theories. The plaintiff can recover damages when it can be shown that the identity of the specific manufacturer is unknown to him and that all manufacturers in the industry controlled industry standards and therefore the risks to product users. This theory has never been applied successfully to a DES case, perhaps because of the larger number of manufacturers. The theory has been accepted for industries where a dominant firm initially controlled the marketing, e.g., blasting caps.
The fourth theory, "market share liability," arose in the decision of the DES case Sindell v. Abbott Labs (7). Under market share liability, defendants may be held liable for a portion of the damages based on the market share they held. Market share liability has been affirmed in New Jersey courts (8) The usual standard of proof of causation required in tort is termed "preponderance of the evidence." This is normally interpreted to mean that the probability of causation was more likely than not, i.e., the probability that the harm was caused by the defendant is greater than 50%.
Many chronic diseases have multiple causes-for example, cancer at certain sites may be caused by toxic agents as well as diet, smoking, and diagnostic radiation. A problem with tort actions, both as a compensation device and as a mechanism for providing incentives for greater care is that only rarely would a single source of the several that may be implicated pass the 50% probability threshold. Thus, toxic agents could produce large numbers of low-level risks of chronic disease to individuals and yet not meet the legal definition of causation in any of the cases that might result. Collectively, small risks of disease to many individuals imply that some individuals will contract those diseases. That those individuals cannot be distinguished from individuals who contracted the disease from other sources such as diet and lifestyle may be reason enough that they go uncompensated by the tort system. However, if no compensation is paid for such harms, the correct incentives will not exist for due care and risk avoidance.
Other Burdens on the Plaintiff Several other features of tort litigation over toxic substance exposure deserve mention. One is the cost to plaintiffs of marshalling the evidence necessary to pursue a lawsuit. Extensive literature reviews and scientific studies are needed; even if the plaintiff is lucky enough to have EPA intervention over a waste site that identifies the responsible parties and the toxic substance, medical evidence on disease causation must still be produced. Good scientific studies are expensive.
However, class action or mass torts could facilitate the pooling of resources by groups of individuals in order to acquire needed scientific information.
Legal fees are another constraint on access to the tort system. In testimony before Congress, George Freeman has noted that plaintiffs attorneys are seldom willing to take cases on a contingent fee basis unless the claim exceeds $75,000. Plaintiffs may have difficulty finding counsel for smaller claims (1) . Furthermore, studies of the costs experienced by asbestos litigants show that legal expenses may absorb two-thirds of the financial outlay by the defendant (11) .
Another barrier in hazardous substance tort litigation occurs when the responsible party is immune from litigation. If the federal government owns a site, victims may be barred from recovery because of sovereign immunity. Barriers to private action also occur when the operator of a waste facility has declared bankruptcy or is financially unable to pay compensation. Finally, in a few states victims may be barred by a harsh statute of limitations that bars tort actions more than two or three years following the date of last exposure. While statutes of limitations for long-latency diseases are being tempered by using discovery of the disease rather than exposure to determine the statutory period, victims still face the challenge of amassing evidence for harms that may have occurred 20 years or more previously.
This review of the legal remedies currently available for injuries and damages from hazardous wastes has shown that those who-are injured sometimes face numerous barriers to recovery in our legal system. However, the common law is evolving rapidly, especially in the area of apportioning liability and in adopting a relaxed rule for applying the statute asbestos cases have been ified; more than 1000 involve DES, several hundred involve formaldehyde, and others concern exposure to benzene, Agent Orange, various drugs, and other chemicals (12) . Though still relatively uncommon, a number of cases have been filed for alleged health effects from drinking water contaminated by hazardous wastes. Thus, an argument could be made that as the common law evolves some of the barriers noted by the 301(e) Study Group will fade in importance.
The one key advantage of tort liability is that judicial verdicts provide a direct economic incentive for firms and individuals who produce, transport and dispose of hazardous substances to engage in appropriate levels of care to minimize liability from tort actions. Because of these economic incentives, it may be important to preserve or enhance opportunities for tort actions regarding personal injury from exposure to hazardous substances. However, a factor that may dilute incentives is that personal injuries due to hazardous substances, especially those originating from environmental exposures, typically become apparent only after long delays. These lags may reduce significantly the incentive effect one would.otherwise observe if events and responses were contemporaneous. For example, if a waste generator faces potential liability 20 years hence, each dollar of that liability would be only a few pennies today at conventional (market) rates of discount. Moreover, future liability is capped by the magnitude of a corporation's net assets at that future date because a firm always has the option of going bankrupt and escaping further costs when liabilities exceed assets.
The incentive effects that could be produced through existing tort liability or through tort law reform do not appear to have been a major consideration of either the 301(e) Study Group or the drafters of toxic compensation bills now before Congress. Indeed, under these proposals, compensation funds would be financed by a broad tax on chemicals and petrochemical feedstocks, in certain cases to be augmented by a tax on waste disposal. Taxes paid to finance the fund would produce negligible incentives for care. However, the federal cause of action and the rights of the fund managers to litigate to recover for payments to victims could produce incentives. Whether these incentives would be appropriate in magnitude to induce due care has not been analyzed, either by the drafters of the proposed legislation or by various commentators.
Evaluating Alternative Remedies
This country has had considerable experience with fund mechanisms for compensating personal injuries. The Black Lung Fund and other federal fund programs share several features of the proposed Tier I compensation fund. U.S. experience with the Black Lung Fund highlights a key difficulty with funds, namely, that pressures are brought through the political process to broaden coverage to include nonmeritorious cases.
Coal dust inhalation has long been known to cause respiratory disability among miners, particularly in underground mines. Despite considerable medical evidence as to the occupational nature of coal miners' black lung, affected miners were largely unable to obtain compensation through state workers' compensation. The first major reform in compensation for this occupational disability came as part of the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969. At that time, the federal government assumed responsiblity for making payments to workers who were totally disabled from the disease. Future compensation costs were estimated to total some $350 million.
In the original 1969 legislation, payments to disabled miners were to be made by the government for only four years. After that date, claims were to be assigned to prior employers for payment. Assigning liability to responsible parties was found to be much more difficult than expected, however, leading to the eventual creation of an industry-financed fund to compensate disabled miners. Financing for the fund came principally from a two-tier tax on production: intitially $0.50 per ton on underground coal and $0.25 on surface coal, subsequently raised to $1 and $0.50 per ton, respectively. This funding mechanism provides no direct financial incentive to operators to avoid dust exposures by their employees.
During the 1970s, Congress and the agencies responsible for administering the program (first the Social Se-curity Administration and later the Department of Labor) came under repeated pressure to liberalize the program so that more miners could receive benefits. Although benefit levels on an individual basis remain modest by almost any standard, the number of miners qualifying for benefits under greatly relaxed standards of eligibility rapidly grew to encompass well over half of all individuals with more than 10 years of mine employment. Despite recent tightening of eligibility standards, total program outlays exceeded $15 billion by the end of 1983, or more than 40 times the original estimate.
As proposed in recent legislative initiatives, the Tier I fund remedy would be financed by a set of uniform taxes on chemical and petroleum feedstocks and perhaps be supplemented by a set of taxes on the disposal of hazardous wastes. A rebuttable presumption would be made in favor of claimants who could establish exposure to hazardous substances and an injury or disease that is believed in the scientific community to result from such exposures. Unless this presumption were rebutted successfully by a party or parties who caused the exposure, the claimant would be paid from the industryfinanced Tier I fund.
Under the proposals of Congressman Florio and Senator Stafford, the federal agency charged with administering the fund would develop a series of scientific background documents on the relationships between exposure to hazardous substances and the risks of contracting various diseases. Material considered relevant to causation would include animal experiments, tissue cultures, epidemiology, and mutagenicity tests.
One unknown in these proposals is how the issue of causation would be handled in these documents and by the administering agency for particular diseases, substances, and exposed populations. Would the agency establish criteria so that only injuries and illnesses having a probability greater than 50% of having originated with exposure to hazardous substances would be One step that has been advocated to improve existing remedies is to change some of the evidentiary requirements of tort actions. In particular, the burden of identifying the defendant and proving to a legal standard that the substance released by the defendant caused harm to the plaintiff could both be modified to a standard of proportional liability. To be sure many courts have already done this with respect to the burden of identifying the defendant. Liability in proportion to the probability of causation would appear to increase efficiency; tort awards would be more closely matched to the best estimate of loss rather than the current all or nothing outcome in court (13). To return once again to the hypothetical situation posed at the outset of this paper, proportional liability might compensate all 110 cases but only for the excess over background levels. That is, each individual would receive 10/110 share of an award.
Conclusion
The 301(e) Study Group report has identified several features of the tort system that may render it unattractive as a compensation device for those harmed by exposure to toxic substances and hazardous wastes. As supplements to the tort system, the Study Group proposed a Tier I compensation fund and a Tier II cause of action in state court. Two of the bills now before Congress adopt the fund proposal but replace the Tier II remedy with a cause of action in federal court. Other proposals dispense with the fund but maintain the cause of action in federal court.
Whether the two-tiered remedy proposed by the Study Group or the bills now before Congress represent an improvement over existing compensation mechanisms is doubtful. There is a great likelihood that Congress would respond to political pressures rather than best scientific evidence resulting in the compensation of large numbers of cases of dubious merit. Moreover, existing programs already may provide sufficient dollar payouts to individuals who have chronic disease.
If the incentive effects of a compensation program are deemed important, alternative reforms of the tort system might be a more logical step to take. One proposal has advocated the incorporation of proportional liability into tort law; however, the feasibility of implementing this potentially interesting proposal has yet to be evaluated.
